INTL304-W5-DB: Problems in Intelligence Collection Strategy
William Bundy presents in his “The Guiding of Intelligence Collection” a picture of a broken intelligence system. Problems that he laments are varied and are as deep-seated as basic communication between individuals. He states that “No one who has ever done research on his own will have even the slightest doubt that the ideal unit is one – a single person doing his own collecting and producing with no intermediaries whatever (Bundy n.d.).” I would add that as anyone who has ever done research on his own (particularly in government service) will know absolutely that this is never the case. Some of the problems that he states include (but in my opinion are not limited to):
1) Defining the requirement- Bundy feels that the analyst (the antagonist of this story, not by malice of forethought but by at least partial ignorance of the collector’s abilities, limitations, and modus operandi) tends to follow a trend in his research that many academics use: instead of broaching new territory, he tackles topics in which there is much information to be had. He feels that analysts are not using collectors to fill gaps, which is the sole purpose of intelligence. He recommends that the intelligence analyst must be trained not to begrudge time spent pointing out intelligence gaps (which is seen as criticism of his work) because it is an integral part of his job. He also suggests that a “new” (relative to the writing of the document in the Cold War) procedure, periodic statement of intelligence gaps, is a promising step toward correcting the problem of gap detection.
2) Stating the requirement - Producers do not, in Bundy’s opinion, state their requirements precisely enough to collectors. It is not so much that they are unable to communicate their requirements, but rather a problem with the requirement being too broad. This is a problem that Bundy feels can be solved with relative ease. Simply by the analyst making his requirements as specific as possible and using the language of the layman to express it.
3) Selecting the appropriate collection system - The problem of choosing the right collection system is a tough one, and again, the problem lies with the analyst. The analysts, through distance, frequently-ludicrous but necessary security procedures, and well-intentioned ignorance, don’t know who to task their requirement to. Bundy’s answer to this problem is a bit weak. “Learn,” is the solution that I feel like I got from this work. The problem with that is that in many cases, the collecting agency operates at the Special Access Program level. The number of people read onto these programs is necessarily few, and that security barrier may make communication with or even understanding the purpose of the collection agency difficult or impossible. Also, reporting coming from such units is subject to redaction and censorship, even among fellow intelligence personnel. Generally, the analyst is aware of the collection agencies that he or she is able to access and liaises frequently with them and so is aware of their collection capability and mission area.
4) Servicing the return - A problem that is not the fault of the analyst is that of servicing the return. By that, Bundy means producing the answer to the requirement. Frequently, there will be a situation where a collector does not have time to compile all of the information into a coherent format before it is “due.” He feels that the assigning of a reports officer to major branches, whose job it is to compile information into at least semi-complete form, is a good step in the right direction.
5) Evaluating the collection - This cannot be emphasized highly enough. There are very few intelligence analysts that receive intelligence reports from collectors who bother to evaluate the report, despite the fact that it would only assist the collector in fulfilling his duties. Many of these problems are specific to the analyst, although non-analysts can make it as well. As to the problem of evaluating and appraising collection, it is quite difficult for the average collector (there are exceptions to this rule, the Department of State being among them) to know whether his collection efforts have been on-track or even helpful due to an inflated sense of professional courtesy. It is this courtesy that keeps us generally from criticizing (evaluating) collection reports, particularly when the collectors belong to separate commands or agencies, even though that is what the collectors need.
This document was an interesting read, and illuminating as there are few analysts who are totally aware of how the world of collection works. However I feel that this document was biased fairly heavily against analysts, with four of the five problems being faults with the analysts, be it problems in our education or our professional culture. Perhaps not all but at least part of the reason for these problems is a self-imposed isolation maintained by collectors. In my experience collectors are friendly and courteous, but aloof. Partly, I feel that this problem is organizational. As I mentioned above, there is the classification issue. This is a constant “elephant in the room” issue in the intelligence community. Perhaps it also has to do with the way that the respective jobs are performed. I know little about the tradecraft of collecting intelligence, but I sense that it is something that requires a great deal of focus and drive. Something that keeps the collector very busy either “in the field” or writing reports. This volume of work rather discourages (generally speaking) idle conversation and it is not frequently a team activity. Analysis, on the other hand, only improves with (appropriate) socialization. Analysts are frequently found in groups of five or more and may discuss their projects with each other, trying to gain fresh insight. Social critters that they are, stuffing them in an isolated, frequently ice cold, frequently small and windowless room tends to make one jittery. We reach out and try to communicate with other people. We try to establish Bundy’s ideal intelligence stream, where the collector hands information to the analyst, who analyzes, fuses, and sends his finished product up to the Customer. My experience is that both through organizational restraints and through differences in personality, there is a barrier between analysts and collectors and that wall must come down before Bundy’s recommendations can be implemented.
Works Cited
Bundy, William. The Guiding of Intelligence Collection. Internal training notes, Langley, VA: CIA.
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